The Impact of Uncle Rewards on Selfish Mining in Ethereum

论文作者:Fabian Ritz ; Alf Zugenmaier

论文发表刊物:2018 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW)

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摘要: Many of today's crypto currencies use blockchains as decentralized ledgers and secure them with proof of work. In case of a fork of the chain, Bitcoin's rule for achieving consensus is selecting the longest chain and discarding the other chain as stale. It has been demonstrated that this consensus rule has a weakness against selfish mining in which the selfish miner exploits the variance in block generation by partially withholding blocks. In Ethereum, however, under certain conditions stale blocks don't have to be discarded but can be referenced from the main chain as uncle blocks yielding a partial reward. This concept limits the impact of network delays on the expected revenue for miners. But the concept also reduces the risk for a selfish miner to gain no rewards from withholding a freshly minted block. This paper uses a Monte Carlo simulation to quantify the effect of uncle blocks both to the profitability of selfish mining and the blockchain's security in Ethereum (ETH). A brief outlook about a recent Ethereum Classic (ETC) improvement proposal that weighs uncle blocks during the selection of the main chain will be given.

推荐人: LiuLu

推荐理由: 在以太坊中,在某些情况下,不必废弃陈旧的区块,而可以从主链中引用陈旧的区块,叔块会产生部分回报。这个概念限制了网络延迟对矿工预期收入的影响。但是降低了自私的矿工的风险。本文使用蒙特卡洛(Monte Carlo)模拟来量化叔块对自私采矿的获利能力和以太坊(ETH)中区块链安全性的影响。研究者们将简要介绍一下最近的以太坊经典(ETC)改进建议,该建议在选择主链时会考虑叔块。






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